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BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO:
REVISITING ANALYST TESTIMONY
AFTER MELENDEZ-DIAZ
ALEX HERSKOWITZ

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Bullcoming v. New Mexico presents the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to revisit its controversial holding in Melendez-Diaz v.
2
Massachusetts. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered whether a
defendant’s right to confront his accuser was violated when the state
introduced the reports of a laboratory analyst, but not the analyst who
3
produced them. By a 5-4 majority, the Melendez-Diaz Court held that
because the affidavit was an out-of-court statement intended for trial,
in other words “testimonial,” the state violated a defendant’s
constitutional right to confront his accuser by not putting the analyst
4
on the stand. Bullcoming poses the question left open by MelendezDiaz: Does the State still violate the Confrontation Clause if it calls to
testify an analyst other than the one who actually performed or
5
observed the laboratory test at issue? Thus, Bullcoming is the Court’s
most recent case in a jurisprudential line addressing the scope of a
defendant’s procedural right to confrontation.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a
defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
6
him.” Defendants benefit from this right through the exclusion of
inculpatory evidence absent an opportunity to confront an accusatory
7
witness. The recent appointment of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan to


2011 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. argued Mar. 2, 2010).
2. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
3. Id. at 2530.
4. Id. at 2532.
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Bullcoming, No. 09-10876 (U.S. May 2, 2010).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“Where testimonial statements are
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the Court calls into question not only whether the holding of
Melendez-Diaz requires a particular analyst at trial, but also its
8
continuing viability.
II. FACTS
In the late afternoon of August 14, 2005, Donald Bullcoming was
arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) after a minor traffic
9
accident in which he rear-ended another vehicle. The other driver
suspected that Bullcoming was drunk—while exchanging information
he had noted Bullcoming’s eyes were bloodshot and he smelled of
10
alcohol. The other driver’s wife called the police to report the
11
accident. By the time the police arrived, Bullcoming had left the
12
scene.
Shortly thereafter, the officer found Bullcoming a short distance
13
from the scene and noted that he appeared to be drunk. The officer
then brought Bullcoming back to the scene of the accident, where a
14
second officer also observed signs of drunkenness. In response to
police questioning, Bullcoming claimed not to have had a drink since
15
6 AM that morning. He failed the field sobriety tests, however, and
16
the police arrested him for DWI. After Bullcoming refused a breath
test, the police obtained a search warrant to perform a blood alcohol
17
test. The test indicated that Bullcoming had a blood alcohol content
18
of .21 percent, well over the legal limit of. 08 percent.
A gas chromatograph machine was used to analyze Bullcoming’s
19
blood alcohol content. New Mexico provides standard laboratory

at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
8. See, e.g., Paul Vinegrad, Two more bottom-side amicus briefs in Bullcoming, THE
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011, 1:25 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
(commenting on Richard Friedman’s blog post and arguing that the Court may revisit the
“relatively new ‘testimonial’ approach of Crawford [v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)]”).
9. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 4 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010).
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procedures that analysts must follow when processing blood
20
samples. The machines produce data that the analysts interpret and
21
validate. The laboratory also preserves the unused portion of the
22
blood sample for six months so it is available for retesting. Per
standard procedure, the analyst who processed Bullcoming’s blood
sample recorded on the forensic report that he had received the
specimen with the seal intact, that he had followed the correct
23
procedures, and that the statements he recorded were correct.
At Bullcoming’s trial for aggravated drunk driving, the State did
24
not call the testing analyst to the stand. Although the State did not
claim that particular analyst was unavailable, the State called a
different analyst from the laboratory—one who did not have any
25
connection to Bullcoming’s sample. Bullcoming objected to this
26
analyst’s testimony as a violation of his confrontation rights. He also
objected to the introduction of the laboratory report as a business
27
record. Ordinarily, hearsay statements made during the regular
course of business are admissible at trial and are not subject to the
28
requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Where, however, the
business conducted specifically is done in anticipation of trial,
admission without opportunity for cross-examination violates the
29
Confrontation Clause. The trial court nonetheless admitted both the
30
Bullcoming
laboratory report and the analyst’s testimony.
subsequently was convicted and sentenced to serve two years in
31
prison. On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the reports were “prepared routinely with guarantees of
32
trustworthiness” and were nontestimonial.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. State v. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d 679, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008), aff’d, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M.
2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (describing business records as
nontestimonial).
29. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 115 (1943) (holding that a report made by a
railroad in anticipation of litigation was not a “business record” for purposes of the hearsay
rule).
30. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d at 684.
31. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 6–7.
32. Bullcoming, 189 P.3d at 685.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Confrontation Clause guarantees that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
33
with the witnesses against him . . . .” Much of the debate surrounding
34
this guarantee concerns who is a “witness against” the defendant. In
35
1980, the Court decided Ohio v. Roberts, which replaced the Court’s
then-existing case-by-case approach with a new Confrontation Clause
36
doctrine. In Roberts, the Court held that hearsay statements are
admissible if the defendant was unavailable and the statements
37
“b[ore] adequate indicia of reliability.” Such “indicia of reliability”
could be inferred if a statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay
38
exception” or showed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
39
In 2004, Crawford v. Washington overruled Roberts and its
progeny. In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, seven members of
the Court established a new framework for interpreting alleged
40
violations of the Confrontation Clause. Under Crawford, a “witness
41
against” a defendant is one who “bear[s] testimony.” The Court
defined testimony as being “typically a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
42
fact.” While declining to identify all classes of testimonial statements,
the Crawford Court noted several important examples that
43
indisputably would fall into this category, including :
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially . . . extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions . . . statements that were made

33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
34. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (finding it necessary to examine the
historical background to resolve which of the various plausible theories about who is a “witness
against” a defendant under the Confrontation Clause is correct).
35. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
36. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 567 (2d ed. 2008).
37. Id. at 66.
38. Id.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.
40. Id. at 43.
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 51–52.
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under circumstances that would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use
44
at a later trial . . . .

After making Confrontation Clause violations contingent on a
45
testimonial hearsay statement, the Crawford Court permitted “only
46
those exceptions established at the time of the founding.” Thus, the
Confrontation Clause had morphed from a substantive reliability rule
47
into a procedural guarantee.
Following Crawford, the Court granted certiorari in Davis v.
48
49
Washington to further define “testimonial” statements. Davis
consolidated two cases involving statements made to police during, or
50
immediately after, an emergency. In an 8-1 decision, with only Justice
Thomas dissenting in part, the Davis Court formulated a new
“primary-purpose” test for determining whether a statement is
51
testimonial in situations involving police interrogations. Under
Davis, “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
52
to meet an ongoing emergency.”
53
Recently decided Michigan v. Bryant addressed a question left
open by Davis: Is an emergency ongoing if the perpetrator of a violent
54
crime may still be in the area? In Michigan, the police questioned a
55
mortally wounded victim half an hour after he had been shot. The
Court held that the victim’s statements had been made during the
course of an ongoing emergency and therefore were nontestimonial

44. Id.
45. Id. at 68 (exempting nontestimonial statements from the Confrontation Clause
regardless of their reliability).
46. Id. at 54 (accepting admissibility of hearsay statements conditioned on “unavailability
and a prior opportunity to cross-examine”).
47. Id. at 67 (“To be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability
of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination.”).
48. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
49. Id. at 817.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 822.
52. Id.
53. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2010).
54. Id. at 1150.
55. Id.
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56

under Crawford. In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized
that the “primary purpose” inquiry is an objective one and does not
seek to determine the “subjective or actual purpose” of the parties
57
involved.
Melendez-Diaz addressed a separate question concerning the
admissibility of laboratory certificates of analysis when the testing
58
analyst does not appear at trial. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that
the “analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts
59
were ‘witnesses’ for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment.” The
analysts’ reports therefore clearly were subject to the Confrontation
60
Clause under the reasoning of Crawford and Davis. The Court stated
that the reports fell into the “core class of testimonial statements”
61
described in Crawford because they “are quite plainly affidavits.”
The affidavits were “incontrovertibly a ‘solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
62
63
fact.’” They served the same purpose as having a live witness testify.
In fact, because the affidavits’ only purpose was for use at trial, under
64
Massachusetts law the affidavits unquestionably were testimonial.
Although denying that pragmatic effects have constitutional
relevance, the Court nonetheless vehemently contested the dissenters’
assertions that applying the Crawford doctrine to laboratory analysts
65
would wreak havoc on an overburdened state prosecution system.
The dissent distinguished the analysts in Melendez-Diaz who had
“witnessed nothing to give them personal knowledge of the
defendant’s guilt” from the “conventional witness[es]” at issue in
66
Crawford and Davis who were witnesses to a crime. The dissenters
feared the majority opinion’s “vast potential to disrupt criminal

56. Id. at 1164.
57. Id. at 1156.
58. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
59. Id. at 2532.
60. Id. (stating that “this case involves little more than the application of our holding in
Crawford v. Washington”).
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
63. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2536 (acknowledging that, while other methods may exist for challenging forensic
reports, the Constitution guarantees only confrontation).
66. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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procedures” and argued that Confrontation Clause doctrine was
67
becoming “a body of formalistic and wooden rules.”
In Bullcoming, the Court will reconcile conflicting state supreme
court and federal circuit court precedents concerning the admissibility
of a non-testifying witness’s statement through the in-court testimony
68
of a substitute expert witness. In addition to New Mexico, two state
69
supreme courts have held that a forensic analyst’s statement,
introduced into court by another forensic analyst, does not violate the
70
71
Confrontation Clause. Two other state supreme courts and two
72
federal circuit courts have ruled in the opposite direction, holding
that a surrogate analyst’s testimony does violate a defendant’s
73
confrontation rights. Though the Court’s decision in Bullcoming may
represent a slight refinement of a doctrinal issue regarding the
sufficiency of substitute procedural safeguards, the practical
implications for law enforcement and defendants could be significant.
IV. HOLDING
74

In State v. Bullcoming, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
the introduction of the blood alcohol report did not violate
Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause rights even though the analyst

67. Id. at 2544.
68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 17.
69. See Rector v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 715–16 (2009) (holding that substitute forensic
analyst’s testimony was valid under the Confrontation Clause where that witness was not a
“mere conduit” for the laboratory report, and that in any event, such error would have been
harmless); Pendergrass v. Indiana, 913 N.E.2d 703, 708 (Ind. 2009), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
Feb. 22, 2010) (No. 09-866) (holding that a lab supervisor knowledgeable of laboratory
procedures may testify in place of a nontestifying forensic analyst employee).
70. Id.
71. Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029 (Mass. 2009) (holding that substitute
medical examiner is “not permitted on direct examination to recite or otherwise testify about
the underlying factual findings of the unavailable medical examiner as contained in the autopsy
report”); State v. Locklear, 363 N.C. 438, 451–53 (2009) (holding that the trial court erred in
admitting testimony of a nontestifying analyst, but that such error was “harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
72. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361–62 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 40 (2008)
(holding that a testing chemist’s conclusions were testimonial and therefore subject to the
Confrontation Clause); United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 2010)
(holding that it violated the Confrontation Clause to admit a certificate of nonexistence of
record through an agent who reviewed the defendant’s file but did not conduct the records
search).
73. Id.
74. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 9 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876).
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75

who performed the test did not testify at trial. The court held that
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights were not violated
because another laboratory employee was available for cross76
examination.
To assess whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause took
place, the New Mexico Supreme Court first examined the question of
77
whether the report at issue was testimonial. Under the State’s theory,
Melendez-Diaz was limited to Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion
because it reflected the narrowest grounds of agreement for a
78
majority of the Court. Justice Thomas concurred in Melendez-Diaz
only because the “reports in question were ‘plainly affidavits,’ and
thus were clearly ‘formalized testimonial materials’ governed by the
79
Confrontation Clause.” The State claimed that because the
certificate at issue in Bullcoming was not a sworn affidavit—the
sticking point for Justice Thomas—there was no Confrontation Clause
80
violation. The court also noted that under Crawford, “‘the absence of
81
oath was not dispositive.’” The New Mexico court held these
arguments unpersuasive, citing the fact that an affidavit is only one
example of “formalized testimonial materials” and its absence
82
therefore is not dispositive. The report here, like the certificates in
Melendez-Diaz, was “‘formalized testimonial material[]’ in that [it
83
was] made ‘for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”
Thus, the court held that the laboratory report was testimonial,
but the court did not stop there. The court then considered whether
the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights had nonetheless been
preserved through the testimony and opportunity to cross-examine a
laboratory analyst not directly involved in testing the defendant’s
84
sample. Calling the analyst who performed the test a “mere

75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 6–9.
78. Id. at 8. In Marks v. United States, the Court issued guidance on interpreting plurality
opinions by stating that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
79. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d at 8.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009)).
84. Id. at 8–9.
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scrivener” and labeling the gas chromatograph machine as the
defendant’s “true accuser[,]” the court held that the “live, in-court
testimony of a separate qualified analyst [was] sufficient to fulfill [the]
85
defendant’s right to confrontation.” Under the court’s reasoning,
because the analysis of the sample required neither interpretation nor
independent judgment, the test results essentially were the equivalent
86
of raw data. The court therefore deemed the testimony of the nontesting analyst a sufficient safeguard of the Confrontation Clause’s
87
protections.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Bullcoming’s (Petitioner’s) Arguments
Petitioner Bullcoming argues that the Confrontation Clause
encompasses a defendant’s right to confront the “particular witness”
88
that is the source of an inculpatory testimonial statement.
Bullcoming finds support for this constitutional requirement—which
he calls the “particular-witness rule”—in the text, purpose, and
89
jurisprudential history of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, the State
may not carve out an exception to this rule by substituting, for
90
example, one laboratory analyst for another, at trial.
1. The Particular-Witness Rule
Bullcoming argues that the Framers’ use of the definite article—
”the”—in the Sixth Amendment’s right “to be confronted with the
witnesses,” read in conjunction with Crawford’s similar use of the
definite article in expounding the exclusionary rule, is a clear
indication that the witness in question is “the particular creator of
91
that evidence.” Similarly, in Melendez-Diaz—”‘[t]he analysts who
swore the affidavits provided testimony against Melendez-Diaz, and
they are therefore subject to confrontation’”—indicates that the

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 13.
Id. at 10–22.
Id at 14.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
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Court was referring to the same analyst providing the forensic
92
report.
The particular-witness rule is necessary to serve the four purposes
of confrontation previously identified by the Court: crossexamination, testifying under oath, observation by a jury, and
93
“‘physical presence’” of the witness. These aspects are thwarted
when the State refuses to provide the particular witness whose
94
testimony is at issue, but instead relies on a surrogate witness.
Invoking Wigmore’s adage that cross-examination is the “‘greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’” Bullcoming
contends that its functions are undermined by surrogate testimony
because personal knowledge, confrontation under oath, and the jury’s
95
ability to observe the accuser’s demeanor are all missing.
2. No Exceptions to the Particular-Witness Rule
Bullcoming contends that the New Mexico Supreme Court erred
96
in creating an exception to the particular-witness rule. The New
Mexico court’s exception was based on its characterization of the
defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine the surrogate analyst as
97
meaningful. Where testimonial statements made by an out-of-court
declarant are at issue, however, the Confrontation Clause allows no
98
exceptions to this rule. The Confrontation Clause does not permit
surrogate witnesses because even if a surrogate witness might satisfy a
defendant’s cross-examination rights, this still would not address the
other three aspects of confrontation—oath, observation, and “physical
99
presence.” Underscoring the importance of these aspects of
confrontation is Crawford’s directive that “[t]he text of the Sixth
Amendment does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the
100
confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts.” A litany
of “good sense” reasons to preclude a forensic-evidence exception to

92. Id. at 27 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 n.6 (2009)).
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 16.
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 25 (“If a ‘particular guarantee’ of the Sixth Amendment is violated, no substitute
procedure can cure the violation . . . .”).
99. Id. at 23–24.
100. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)) (quotation marks omitted).
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the particular-witness rule also indicates why surrogate witnesses do
101
not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
Particularly compelling
reasons include the risk of error, falsification, poor judgment, and
102
improper training of forensic analysts.
For these reasons, Bullcoming disputes that the Constitution
allows any exceptions to the particular-witness rule. If the Court
disagrees, however, an exception would not be warranted under the
103
facts of this case. The analyst who performed Bullcoming’s test was
104
later placed on administrative leave without pay. Had that analyst
testified the State would have been forced to disclose the reasons for
this disciplinary action—reasons that may have cast doubt on his
105
credibility as a witness. As Justice Scalia noted during oral
106
arguments, “boy, it smells bad to me.”
Bullcoming also rejects the New Mexico Supreme Court’s
rationale that the analyst who conducted the test was a “mere
scrivener,” making the testimony of the surrogate witness a sufficient
107
protection of his confrontation rights. The Confrontation Clause is a
procedural guarantee; it applies even if the analyst was nothing more
108
than a transcriptionist. In this case, however, that the declarations in
109
the analyst’s forensic report went far beyond mere transcriptions.
B. New Mexico’s (Respondent’s) Argument
Respondent New Mexico vigorously disputes the New Mexico
Supreme Court’s concession that the analyst’s report in Bullcoming is
110
testimonial. Justice Thomas’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz constrained
the type of statements that could be considered testimonial to
extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
111
confessions.” As a contemporaneous, unsworn, non-adversarial
101. Id. at 28–31.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 26.
104. Id. at 31.
105. Id.
106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 2010).
107. Id. at 35–36.
108. Id. at 36.
109. Id. at 36–37.
110. Brief for Respondent at 7, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. Jan. 10,
2011).
111. Id. at 12.
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public record it is not “formalized testimonial materials” that would
112
violate the Confrontation Clause.
New Mexico also distinguishes the Melendez-Diaz affidavit from
the report in Bullcoming because of the “inquisitorial” nature of the
113
former. The Confrontation Clause was a response to the “commonlaw abuse of admitting at trial statements made to magistrates during
114
pre-trial ex parte examinations.” By focusing on the development of
the Clause as a response to these abusive investigatory procedures,”
the confrontation right is implicated only when the inquisitorial
investigation substitutes for the adversarial examination of witnesses
115
at trial.”
The affidavit in Melendez-Diaz was “inquisitorial” because its
purpose was to incriminate the defendant, it was prepared at the
request of a police officer, and the analyst did not swear to the
116
affidavit until a week after the laboratory test was performed. In
contrast, New Mexico characterizes the statement at issue in
Bullcoming as a non-inquisitorial public record because it
“contain[ed] routine scientific observations by public officials who are
independent of law enforcement, even if they are made at the arm’s
117
length request of a police officer.”
New Mexico invites the Court to overrule the Davis primarypurpose test as “unworkable, flawed, and overly broad in relation to
118
the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Limiting the protections
of the Confrontation Clause to “inquisitorial abuses” aligns most
closely with the Framers’ original intent to protect against
119
prosecutorial abuse.
Under this view, noncustodial police
investigations—whether or not they are conducted during the course
of an emergency—are non-adversarial and therefore would not be
120
subject to the exclusionary rule. Likewise, “scientific analysis is not
an interrogation and does not present a danger of prosecutorial
121
abuse.”

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 37, 41–42.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 35.
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New Mexico proposes that the Court should adopt a rule first
122
announced in United States v. Inadi. Under this rule, testimonial
statements would be narrowly defined as those statements made to
prosecutorial or judicial authorities that lack any “independent
123
evidentiary significance.” A testimonial statement would have no
“independent evidentiary significance” if that statement could be
124
“replicated by in-court testimony.” This proposed rule best responds
125
to the Framers’ concerns.
Even if the Court determines that the laboratory report at issue in
Bullcoming is testimonial, New Mexico argues that Bullcoming’s Sixth
Amendment rights were protected by the opportunity to retest the
126
sample. Retesting the sample would serve the same purposes as
cross-examination by testing the laboratory analyst’s recollection,
veracity, skill, ambiguity of result and any possible transcription
127
128
error. Thus, if there was an error, it was harmless.
VI. LIKELY DISPOSITION
Bullcoming presents an opportunity for the Court to modify its
approach to Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with regard to
129
forensic evidence. Since Melendez-Diaz was decided (by a 5-4 vote),
two members of the majority—Justices Souter and Stevens—have left
the Court. Thus, if either Justices Sotomayor or Kagan aligns with the
Melendez-Diaz minority that precedent could be overturned or
significantly narrowed. During her confirmation hearing, thenSolicitor General Elena Kagan openly discussed her concerns about
the practical effects of the Court’s opinions, specifically citing the
130
impact of Melendez-Diaz on the criminal justice system. Justice
Sotomayor, as a former prosecutor and trial judge, may also be
sympathetic to the concerns of state prosecutors and law
131
enforcement.
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor’s record as an
122. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
123. Brief for Respondent, supra note 110, at 51 (quoting Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394).
124. Id. at 49.
125. Id. at 47.
126. Id. at 52.
127. Id. at 52–56.
128. Id. at 59.
129. Vinegrad, supra note 8.
130. Andrew Ramonas & Channing Turner, Kagan Hearings–Live Hearings, MAIN JUSTICE
(June 29, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/06/29/kagan-hearing-live-updates/.
131. Jonathan Adler, Souter, Sotomayor, & Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 29, 2009, 5:55 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/1246125087.shtml (arguing that

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

4/12/2011 5:45:49 PM

BULLCOMING V. NEW MEXICO: REVISITING ANALYST TESTIMONY

207

appellate judge indicates that she could be more attuned to pragmatic
132
rather than doctrinal concerns.
The remaining members of the Melendez-Diaz majority—Justices
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas—likely will stay intact as Bullcoming
appears to be a logical extension of their holding. Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg almost certainly will find Bullcoming, like Melendez-Diaz,
133
to be “a rather straightforward application of Crawford.” Justice
Thomas likely will conclude that Bullcoming retains the requisite
134
level of formality for a testimonial statement.
If a majority of the Justices choose to affirm the New Mexico
Supreme Court, it is unclear how they would distinguish MelendezDiaz. First, New Mexico’s position that Justice Thomas’s concurrence
constrains the holding in Melendez-Diaz is undermined by the
majority’s opinion in that case. That opinion “flatly reject[s]” the
135
notion that analysts are not “accusatory” witnesses. Moreover, the
“wholesale dismissal of the fundamental underpinnings of the dictum
portion of the majority’s opinion necessarily would require a rejection
136
of the holding in Crawford.”
Second, the Court is unlikely to give much weight to the argument
that both scientific data and the conclusions drawn from it are
nontestimonial. In their amicus brief, some of the States’ argue that
scientific data or observations “are merely a premise of [scientific
conclusions]” because “when considered in isolation” conclusions lack
137
significance. This argument is unlikely to persuade the MelendezDiaz majority because, as Professor Richard Friedman of the

Justice Sotomayor’s “ascension to the Court could have dramatic consequences for criminal law,
as she could create a new Court majority on these issues and roll back recent decisions on the
Confrontation Clause”).
132. Id. (“[H]er criminal law opinions provide little evidence of a strong civil libertarian
streak of the sort that would lead her to apply constitutional protections for criminal defendants
in a strict and unyielding manner.”).
133. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533 (2009).
134. Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
135. John Wait, Another “Straightforward Application”: The Impact of Melendez-Diaz on
Forensic Testing and Expert Testimony in Controlled Substance Cases, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1,
14 (2010).
136. Id. at 15.
137. Brief for the States of California, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14, Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Brief for the States].
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University of Michigan notes, “[d]ata and observations are not
testimonial . . . [but] a report of them is, if made in anticipation of
138
prosecutorial use.”
Notably, during oral arguments, Justice Scalia, in response to the
New Mexico Attorney General’s attempt to distinguish the report in
Bullcoming from Melendez-Diaz, quipped that the Bullcoming report
139
“was prepared just for fun, not for use in trial?” Justice Sotomayor
also contested the Attorney General’s “mere scrivener” theory that
140
the New Mexico court had adopted. Sotomayor noted that the
analyst was not “simply looking at a number and putting it on a
report[,]” but was also certifying a number of other things like the
condition the sample was received in and that standard procedures
141
were followed. Moreover, citing Melendez-Diaz, the New Mexico
Supreme Court conceded that “the blood alcohol report was
142
testimonial” and the Supreme Court’s question presented implicitly
143
presumes that the report is testimonial.
Third, the Court’s recent decision in Bryant demonstrates that the
144
Davis primary-purpose test is alive and well. The Bryant decision
145
clarified much of the ambiguity complained of by New Mexico.
Under Bryant, the “primary purpose of an interrogation” is based on
146
“[a]n objective analysis” of the surrounding circumstances. The
Court therefore will inquire into “the purpose that reasonable
participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’

138. Richard Friedman, States’ amicus brief in Bullcoming, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG
(Jan. 17, 2011 5:43 PM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2011/01/states-amicus-brief-inbullcoming.html.
139. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 2010).
140. Id. at 33–34 (“I’m sorry. He’s not simply looking at a number and putting it on a report.
He’s certifying to certain things. He’s certifying to following certain steps, that the evidence
wasn’t tampered with. He’s certifying that he’s complied with all the requirements of New
Mexico law with respect to the report . . . .”).
141. Id.
142. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 1 (N.M. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. Bullcoming v.
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 62 (2010) (No. 09-10876).
143. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at i (The question presented reads:
“Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements
of a nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person
who did not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements.”).
144. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2010) (holding that the statements at issue
were testimonial under the primary purpose test).
145. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 110, at 43 (arguing that the primary purpose test
“is unworkable because it does not clarify whose purpose must be examined”).
146. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
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statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter
147
occurred.”
Attorney General King tried to apply Davis’s primary-purpose
148
rule to the analyst’s report in Bullcoming. In so doing, he focused on
whether an interrogation was taking place, and, if so, the statements
149
would be regarded as testimonial. In Bullcoming, because there was
no interrogation, Attorney General King argued that the reports are
nontestimonial. Justice Scalia responded, however, that whether an
interrogation occurs “doesn’t make any difference. That is not the
150
condition for the application of the . . . Confrontation Clause.” The
reports in Bullcoming were prepared for trial. Given Justice Scalia’s
comments the Court is likely to hold that the analyst’s report is
testimonial under Davis.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer
almost certainly will reject Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause
challenge. They dissented in Melendez-Diaz and could adopt the
reasoning in that dissenting opinion to conclude that analysts are not
151
traditional witnesses with personal knowledge of events. At oral
argument, questions from Justice Alito reflected reasoning that would
support his holding that laboratory reports are nontestimonial under
Crawford. For example, Justice Alito emphasized that the testimonial
information in the analyst’s report could be established by indirect
152
evidence. Justice Alito also asked Attorney General King whether
there was any way the police could influence promotions at the
153
laboratory. This line of questioning could be an attempt to justify
holding that the analyst report in Bullcoming is nontestimonial—first,
because the report is not meant to serve as a substitute for live
testimony and second, because the laboratory employees are
independent of the police.
The practical implications of ruling in favor of Bullcoming also

147. Id.
148. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 139, at 31.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 42.
151. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2551 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (describing a witness as someone who observes an event and therefore has personal
knowledge of that event).
152. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 139, at 35 (asking if the State could prove with
indirect evidence the results of the blood alcohol content test, that the sample was Bullcoming’s,
and that standard procedures were followed).
153. Id.
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counsel against extending Melendez-Diaz. Notably, the States have
objected to the additional burdens that Melendez-Diaz has imposed
on already overburdened and underfunded prosecutorial systems that
154
require forensic laboratory analysts to testify at trial. As Justices
Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas appear inclined to maintain the views
they expressed in Melendez-Diaz, the outcome in Bullcoming rests
largely on the votes of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan—both of whom
can be expected to give substantial weight to the states’ practical
155
concerns.
The Bullcoming Court is more likely to reject or distinguish
Melendez-Diaz than it is to affirm and extend its holding. The
Melendez-Diaz decision greatly fractured the Crawford coalition
while leaving open the question of whether a state may substitute
analysts at trial. Bullcoming therefore is a prime opportunity for the
newly constituted Court to refine its Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and resolve a troubling issue of modern-day criminal
law.

154. Brief for the States, supra note 137, at 5–8.
155. Ramonas & Turner, supra note 130; Adler, supra note 131.

